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Introduction 
Influenza is wrongly seen as a mild disease, but it can seriously 
harm and kill, especially but not exclusively within vulnerable 
segments of the population.1 One step hospitals are increasingly 
taking to protect vulnerable patients is requiring their employees to 
 
†  Rene F. Najera, MPH, is a Doctor of Public Health student at 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, John Hopkins University. Dorit R. 
Reiss is a Professor of Law at UC Hastings College of the Law. We are 
grateful to Melody Anne Butler, Karen Ernst, and Paul Offit for very, 
very helpful comments on previous drafts and to Mira Karageorge and 
Rob Taobada for excellent research work. 
1. Martin G. Myers, The History of Vaccine Development and the Diseases 
Vaccines Prevent, in VACCINOLOGY: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 1, 27-28 (Greg 
N. Milligan & Alan D.T. Barrett eds., 2015). 
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get an annual influenza vaccine.2 Opponents, unsurprisingly, attack 
this policy as harmful to employees’ rights. This article examines the 
legal issues surrounding that policy.  
During June 2014, a New Jersey Court of Appeals ruled that a 
hospital offering non-medical, religious exemptions from its policy of 
mandating influenza vaccines cannot deny unemployment benefits to 
a nurse whose opposition to the vaccine was based on secular 
reasoning.3 While the case focused on unemployment benefits rather 
than the mandate itself, the court’s reasoning in Valent v. Board of 
Review, Department of Labor suggested that if a hospital offers any 
non-medical exemptions from influenza vaccine mandates, it then 
needs to extend exemptions to any employee with concerns, and 
cannot limit exemptions to just those with religious objections.4  
If other courts follow the Valent court’s reasoning, hospitals 
wishing to impose immunization requirements may face a choice 
between not offering religious exemptions or not being able to enforce 
vaccination mandates. Even if other courts do not agree with Valent, 
hospitals should seriously consider whether it is prudent to offer any 
non-medical exemptions, since such exemptions are subject to abuse 
and are not legally or constitutionally required. 
The ruling in Valent presents an opportunity to consider the legal 
issues surrounding mandatory vaccination of health care workers. We 
agree with Stewart and Cox that state mandates are a better choice 
than voluntary action by hospitals: they are more efficient, impose 
uniform requirements across providers, and provide more certainty to 
patients.5 But as Stewart and Cox highlight, only a significant 
minority of states have adopted laws addressing this issue, and many 
of those laws 6 lack strong enforcement mechanisms and may therefore 
only loosely be considered vaccine mandates. Voluntary action taken 
by hospitals may serve as an important intermediate measure until 
states pass more effective legislation. Understanding the legal 
framework for both the statutory and the employer-based options—
for example what can and cannot be done and where problems may 
arise—can help hospitals or legislatures better think through this 
issue.  
 
2. Henry H. Bernstein & Jeffrey R. Starks, Influenza Immunization for All 
Health Care Personnel: Keep it Mandatory, 136 PEDIATRICS 809, 812 
(2015). 
3. Valent v. Board of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2014). 
4. Id. at 647-48. 
5. Alexandra M. Stewart & Marisa A. Cox, State Law and Influenza 
Vaccination of Health Care Personnel, 31 VACCINE 827, 830 (2013).  
6. Id. at 828. 
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A. Adoption of Influenza Vaccine Mandates 
The last thing someone who is hospitalized needs is to contract 
another illness during their stay. Some illnesses are harder to avoid 
than others, but for others we have readily available vaccines. A 
prime example is the vaccine against seasonal influenza. Twenty 
states have statutes addressing influenza vaccination of health care 
workers, and more may follow.7 In states without mandatory 
vaccination laws, some hospitals voluntarily require employees to be 
vaccinated out of the laudable desire to protect vulnerable patients 
against a dangerous disease.8 Increasingly, hospitals around the 
country have adopted policies requiring health care workers to be 
vaccinated against influenza, with sanctions up to and including firing 
imposed against recalcitrant employees.9  
The influenza vaccine is not one of the most effective vaccines,10 
although it is not as ineffective as anti-vaccine websites like to 
pretend. This lack of effectiveness is not because scientists working on 
it are less competent than scientists working on other vaccines, but 
because it is objectively more difficult to produce.11 The influenza 
virus mutates quickly, often rearranging its genes enough to trigger 
yearly epidemics in different regions of the world at different times.12  
Occasionally, the mutation will be severe enough that the whole of 
humanity is not immune at the same time, triggering a pandemic like 
the one recently seen in 2009.13 Additionally, the influenza virus grows 
best—and slowly—in eggs rather than in tissue cultures like other 
viruses, though more recently some vaccines have been produced 
 
7. Id. 
8. Some of these institutions can be found here: Wall of Shame, NURSES 
AGAINST MANDATORY VACCINES, http://www.namv.org/healthcare-
organizations-that-mandate-vaccines.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015); 
Influenza Vaccination Honor Roll, IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL., 
http://www.immunize.org/honor-roll/influenza-mandates/honorees.asp 
(last updated Feb. 11, 2016) (providing a list of institutions that 
mandate vaccination).  
9. Jane M. Orient, Mandatory Influenza Vaccination for Medical Workers: 
A Critique, 17 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 111, 114 (2012). 
10. CDC, Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness, 2005-2015, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/effectiveness-
studies.htm. 
11. CDC, Selecting the Viruses in the Seasonal Influenza (Flu) Vaccine 
(2015), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/virusqa.htm. 
12. WHO, Biologicals: Influenza, http://www.who.int/biologicals/vaccines/ 
influenza/en/. 
13. See F. Carrat & A. Flahault, Influenza Vaccine: The Challenge of 
Antigenic Drift, 25 VACCINE 6852, 6854 (2007). 
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using mammalian and insect cell lines.14 This results in a hefty 
investment in eggs for growing the virus, and given the time needed 
to grow the virus, it means that the strain that is to be grown must 
be picked carefully six months ahead of the next flu season.15 This 
process sometimes leads to a mismatch between the vaccine strain 
and the strain that actually circulates during the annual flu 
outbreak.16 In spite of all that, the vaccine, although not perfect, is 
our best protection against influenza. In good years, its effectiveness 
ranges from 60-70%17—a substantial reduction in the chances of 
contracting the disease. In bad years, it can be much less. For 
example, in the 2014-2015 influenza season, one of the strains 
mutated after the creation of the vaccine, leading to substantially 
reduced effectiveness—only 23% effective in completely preventing 
influenza across all age groups (although effectiveness was higher in 
children).18 Still, 23% effectiveness is still higher than the zero percent 
non-vaccination provides. Even if the vaccine fails to prevent the 
disease completely, it can reduce its severity.19 Also, it’s an extremely 
safe vaccine.20 
A recent meta-analysis of twelve observational studies found that 
some research shows that health care workers, for the most part, 
 
14. Anthony E. Fiore et al., Inactivated Influenza Vaccines, in VACCINES 
257, 266-68 (Stanley A. Plotkin et al. eds., 6th ed. 2013). 
15. See CDC, How Influenza (Flu) Vaccines are Made, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/vaccine/how-fluvaccine-made.htm (last 
updated Jan. 6, 2015). 
16. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., The Evolution, and Revolution, of Flu 
Vaccines (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/ 
consumerupdates/ucm336267.htm. 
17. CDC, Interim Estimates of 2013-14 Seasonal Influenza Vaccine 
Effectiveness – United States. February 2014, 63 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 137, 141 (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6307a1.htm; CDC, 
Estimated Influenza Illnesses and Hospitalizations Averted by Influenza 
Vaccine – United States, 2012-13 Influenza Season, 62 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 997, 999 (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6249a2.htm. 
18. CDC, Protection from Flu Vaccination Reduced this Season (Jan. 15, 
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0115-flu-
vaccination.html.  
19. CDC, Influenza 151, 159, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pubs/pinkbook/ 
downloads/flu.pdf; JM Kelso, Safety of Influenza Vaccines, 12 CURRENT 
OPINION IN ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 383; CDC, Key Facts 
About Seasonal Flu Vaccine: Benefits, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/keyfacts.htm#benefits.  
20. CDC, Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Safety: A Summary for Clinicians, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/vaccine_safety.htm. 
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agreed with mandates to get vaccinated as a condition of 
employment.21 Almost all of the participants in one of the studies 
(96.7%) were of the opinion that being immunized protected the 
patients they served.22 Indeed, a 1994-1995 study found that 
immunizing health care workers in a geriatric care facility reduced 
mortality from influenza in the elderly patients more than vaccinating 
the patients themselves.23 A randomized controlled trial in 2000 found 
a similar effect.24 With regards to patient populations other than the 
elderly, a 1997-2000 study of vaccine uptake and morbidity and 
mortality in a hospital in Virginia showed that increased vaccine 
uptake was associated with a lower number of nosocomial (hospital 
acquired) cases and deaths from influenza.25 
There is a strong ethical case for requiring vaccination of health 
care workers against influenza. This is based on health care workers’ 
autonomous choice to work in a profession in which they care for 
vulnerable individuals, they have responsibilities to patients and the 
community, and the resulting high costs in lives and suffering if they 
spread influenza because they did not receive the vaccine.26 
However, while most health care workers understand and support 
the requirement to vaccinate against influenza,27 a small minority 
opposes it. Some oppose it because of the opposition to mandates.28 
 
21. See Samantha A. Pitts et al., A Systematic Review of Mandatory 
Influenza Vaccination in Healthcare Personnel, 47 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 330, 337 (2014). 
22. Id. 
23. J. Potter et al., Influenza Vaccination of Health Care Workers in Long-
Term-Care Hospitals Reduces the Mortality of Elderly Patients, 175 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE 1, 1 (1997). 
24. W.F. Carman et al., Effects of Influenza Vaccination of Health-Care 
Workers on Mortality of Elderly People in Long-Term Care: A 
Randomised Controlled Trial, 355 THE LANCET 93, 93-97 (2000). 
25. Cassandra D. Salgado et al., Preventing Nosocomial Influenza by 
Improving the Vaccine Acceptance Rate of Clinicians, 25 INFECTION 
CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY 923, 923-27 (2004). 
26. See Arthur L. Caplan, Time to Mandate Influenza Vaccination in 
Health-care Workers , 378 THE LANCET 310, 310-11 (2011); Abigale L. 
Ottenberg et al., Vaccinating Health Care Workers Against Influenza: 
The Ethical and Legal Rationale for a Mandate, 101 AM. J. PUBLIC 
HEALTH 212, 212 (2011). 
27. Kristen A. Feemster et al., Employee Designation and Health Care 
Worker Support of an Influenza Vaccine Mandate at a Large Pediatric 
Tertiary Care Hospital, 29 VACCINE 1762, 1766 (2011). 
28. See Kinesh Patel, Resisting the Needle: Why I Won’t Have the Flu Jab, 
BMJ (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.bmj.com/content/343/ 
bmj.d6554?ijkey=92b2cf3e3f35e1d441a52de965e0bf1fe9bfd69d&keytype2
=tf_ipsecsha. But see Amy J. Behrman et al., Doctors Choosing Not to 
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Others oppose it because of unfounded fears or anti-vaccine views.29 
This viewpoint is especially troubling from a health care worker: if a 
health care worker cannot trust something supported by evidence as 
extensive as that supporting the safety of vaccines,30 how can they 
trust the rest of the medical care they are ostensibly providing? 
Furthermore, like the legal field, health care is a service profession. 
Those who enter the field choose a job in which their role is to serve 
and care for people who depend on and trust them. By making that 
choice, a person is accepting certain limits on their conduct. If they 
are unwilling to take the simple, safe precaution of an influenza 
vaccine to protect the vulnerable patients under their care (a 
protection that also protects them against a dangerous disease), a 
health care worker is, arguably, failing that service duty.31 
This Article explores the legal issues surrounding the influenza 
vaccine requirement for health care workers. It highlights that the 
requirement is in fact legitimate and legal, though collective 
bargaining can limit what employers facing unionized work forces can 
do unilaterally. We argue that while medical exemptions may be 
required and are arguably desirable, there is no legal or constitutional 
requirement to offer any other exemptions. It also highlights that if 
an employer wants to provide a religious exemption, they are subject 
to certain requirements that may make the exemption vulnerable to 
abuse or allow it to swallow the mandate.  
Part I sets the background by providing the data behind the 
employers’ choice to require vaccinating against influenza. It 
demonstrates that the vaccine is safe and can help protect patients 
and save lives. Part II addresses the basic legality and 
constitutionality behind requiring influenza vaccines, the litigation 
surrounding it, as it has been until now, and what we know from 
 
Be Vaccinated is Choosing to Do Harm, BMJ (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d7198?tab=citation.  
29. See, e.g., Final Thoughts on the Bashista Case, NURSES AGAINST 
MANDATORY VACCINES (Aug. 30, 2014), 
http://nursesagainstmandatoryvaccines.wordpress.com/2014/08/30/final
-thoughts-on-the-bashista-case/. 
30. INST. MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF 
STUDIES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE RECOMMENDED 
CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE, THE CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION 
SCHEDULE AND SAFETY:  STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
AND FUTURE STUDIES, xiv (Michael Hayes ed., 2013), 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13563&page=1. 
31. Kristen A. Feemster & Arthur L. Caplan, Should Flu Shots for Health 
Professionals Be Required?, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.amednews.com/article/20130408/profession/130409953/5/; 
Behrman et al., supra note 27. 
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other areas of the law. Part III examines the tricky question of 
whether an employer is required to offer a religious exemption. It 
highlights that a religious exemption is not required under our 
Constitution;32 nor is it required under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33 
It also suggests that there is a strong argument that states with a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) do not require even 
public hospitals to offer a religious exemption. Part III also explains 
the limits on and requirements of hospitals that choose to offer a 
religious exemption from immunization requirements. Part IV lays out 
our recommendations. We support state level statutory mandates, 
and recommend including an enforcement mechanism. Absent such 
mandates, we urge private employees to adopt their own mandate, 
and provide medical exemptions, but not other exemptions.  
I. Why Vaccinate Health Care Workers Against 
Influenza?  
In the United States, anywhere from 3,000 to 49,000 deaths are 
attributed to influenza each year.34 Of those, the great majority are a 
result of secondary bacterial infections or exacerbations of preexisting 
medical conditions.35 The majority of those who die during any given 
influenza season are very old, very young (e.g. neonates-newborns), or 
very sick (e.g. cancer patients).36 One way to protect these 
populations is by immunizing them against influenza, pneumococcus, 
and H. influenzae—the latter two being common bacterial 
complications of an influenza infection.37 However, this immunization 
strategy has some limits. First, the people who comprise these groups 
are made up mostly of persons whose immune system function is not 
 
32. Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The 
Public Health Imperative and Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH PRACTICE 262, 274 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2nd ed. 
2007). 
33. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
34. Estimating Seasonal Influenza-Associated Deaths in the United States: 
CDC Study Confirms Variability of Flu, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/us_flu-related_deaths.htm (last 
updated Sept. 12, 2013). 
35. Id. 
36. CDC, Estimates of Deaths Associated with Seasonal Influenza --- United 
States, 1976—2007, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1057, 
1057-62 (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtml/mm5933a1.htm. 
37. Michael B. Rothberg et al., Complications of Viral Influenza, 121 AM. J. 
MED. 258, 260 (Apr. 4, 2008), http://download.thelancet.com/ 
flatcontentassets/H1N1-flu/pathogenesis/pathogenesis-8.pdf. 
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normal. Neonates may not develop their own immune response to the 
influenza vaccine until age six months.38 The elderly may not mount 
an efficient immune response to the vaccine because of their advanced 
age as well.39 People on chemotherapy may be immune deficient as a 
side effect of their treatment.40 
Even with the technical limitations of being unable to predict the 
next strain of influenza with 100% certainty and having to grow most 
of the vaccine viruses in eggs, the influenza vaccine is the best defense 
against influenza available in vaccine form. It is not 100% effective, 
nor near that, however.41 A meta-analysis of over 40 years of influenza 
vaccine studies found that the vaccine’s effectiveness depended on the 
age of the people getting it as well as the formulation (i.e. live, 
attenuated intranasal vaccine versus killed injected vaccine).42 
The influenza vaccine has a good track record of safety.43 In 
children, the vaccine is not associated with serious side effects.44 
During pregnancy, the influenza vaccine has been shown to prevent 
serious outcomes from influenza infection in pregnant women while 
 
38. Paul A. Offit et al., Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Multiple 
Vaccines Overwhelm or Weaken the Infant’s Immune System?. 109 
PEDIATRICS 124, 125 (2002), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/ 
content/109/1/124.short. 
39. See E. Bernstein et al., Immune Response to Influenza Vaccination in a 
Large Healthy Elderly Population, 17 VACCINE 82, 82 (1999). 
40. See, e.g., Leagh M. Boehmer et al., Influenza Vaccination in Patients 
With Cancer: An Overview, CANCER NETWORK (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.cancernetwork.com/oncology-journal/influenza-vaccination-
patients-cancer-overview.  
41. See e.g., Vaccine Effectiveness - How Well Does the Flu Vaccine 
Work?, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/vaccineeffect.htm (last 
updated Dec. 21, 2015); CDC, Estimated Influenza Illnesses and 
Hospitalizations Averted by Influenza Vaccine – United States, 2012-13 
Influenza Season, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 993, 997 
(Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6249a2.htm. 
42. See Michael T. Osterholm et al., THE COMPELLING NEED FOR GAME-
CHANGING INFLUENZA VACCINES 5-6 (2012), 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/sites/default/files/public/downloads/ccivi_
report.pdf. 
43. Influenza Vaccine Safety, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/ 
vaccine/vaccinesafety.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).  
44. See, e.g., Jason M. Glanz et al., Safety of Trivalent Inactivated 
Influenza Vaccine in Children Aged 24 to 59 Months in the Vaccine 
Safety Datalink, ARCH. PEDIATRIC ADOLESC. MED. 749, 749-50 (2011); 
Nicholas Wood et al., Influenza Vaccine Safety in Children Less Than 5 
Years Old: The 2010 and 2011 Experience in Australia, 31 PEDIATRIC 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 199, 199-202 (2012). 
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not being associated with serious side effects in the women or their 
fetuses.45 Even persons with egg allergies, long believed to be ineligible 
for receiving the influenza vaccine because the vaccine virus is grown 
in eggs, can receive the vaccine safely.46 While not used in the United 
States, vaccines with adjuvants (chemicals used to enhance the 
immune response) have also been shown to be safe and very 
effective.47 
As stated previously, influenza vaccine effectiveness depends on 
different factors. The live, attenuated vaccine has been shown to work 
best in children while having decreased effectiveness in older adults.48 
On the other hand, injectable vaccines have been shown to work best 
in older adults.49 Currently, high-dose vaccines are recommended for 
older adults because more antigens are needed in the vaccine to 
trigger an immune response.50 Most health care workers will fall 
somewhere between children and the elderly, making them prime 
candidates for any vaccine formulation, albeit with the knowledge 
that the vaccine will not be 100% effective in any population. 
In order to prevent influenza transmission in the health care 
setting, health care workers have different choices. They can wear 
masks that are not guaranteed to prevent transmission and whose 
proper use cannot be guaranteed.51 They can wash their hands with 
 
45. Glanz, supra note 44. 
46. John M. James et al., Safe Administration of Influenza Vaccine to 
Patients with Egg Allergy, 133 J. PEDIATRICS 624, 624 (1998). 
47. Murdo Ferguson et al., Safety and Long-Term Humoral Immune 
Response in Adults After Vaccination With an H1N1 2009 Pandemic 
Influenza Vaccine With or Without AS03 Adjuvant, 205 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 733 (2012), http://jid.oxfordjournals.org/content/ 
205/5/733.short. 
48. Lisa A. Grohskopf et al., Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza 
with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Aug. 
15, 2014), at 691-692, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6332a3.htm. 
49. See David Holland et al., Intradermal Influenza Vaccine Administered 
Using a New Microinjection System Produces Superior Immunogenicity 
in Elderly Adults: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 198 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 650, 657 (Sep. 2008). 
50. Ann R. Falsey et al., Randomized, Double-Blind Controlled Phase 3 
Trial Comparing the Immunogenicity of High-Dose and Standard-Dose 
Influenza Vaccine in Adults 65 Years of Age and Older, 200 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 172, 172 (2009). 
51. Mark Loeb et al., Surgical Mask vs N95 Respirator for Preventing 
Influenza Among Health Care Workers A Randomized Trial, 302 JAMA 
1865, 1870 (2009). 
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every patient contact. However, guidelines about washing their hands 
are often not followed by health care workers for a variety of 
reasons.52 Influenza vaccination is a passive method for reducing cases 
and deaths from influenza of patients and workers in health care 
settings. That is, it doesn’t require anything more than being 
immunized, and especially combined with proper hand washing and 
use of personal protective equipment like masks, it can be part of a 
comprehensive and highly effective influenza outbreak mitigation 
strategy. 
II: Mandating Vaccines 
Vaccine mandates can stem from one of two sources, and different 
legal frameworks apply to each. The first source is state statute or 
state regulations. The second is employers’ workplace rules. The legal 
situation is somewhat different between the two. This section starts 
by describing the adoption of mandates first in the hospitals, where 
the idea started, then by state legislatures. Then it separates out a 
discussion of the legal issues, first for states and then for hospitals.  
A. First Steps: Voluntary Mandates in Hospitals 
The first hospitals to adopt mandatory immunizations policies 
were Bronson Methodist Hospital in Kalamazoo, Michigan and 
Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, in 2005.53 By 
2009, twenty-five other institutions did the same.54 Hundreds more 
followed, but the number of health care institutions doing so remained 
minute compared to the number of existing health care providers.55 
In addition, twenty states passed laws addressing vaccination of 
health care workers, though not all of them actually mandate 
vaccination, and only three address sanctions for non-compliance.56  
Let’s consider one example of a hospital-initiated mandate. In a 
detailed PowerPoint, Dr. Susan Coffin from the Children’s Hospital of 
Philadelphia described the hospital’s experience with an influenza 
 
52. Sile A. Creedon, Healthcare Workers’ Hand Decontamination Practices: 
Compliance With Recommended Guidelines, 51 J. ADVANCED NURSING 
208, 208 (Aug. 2005). 
53. Alexandra M. Stewart & Sara Rosenbaum, Vaccinating the Health-Care 
Workforce: State Law vs. Institutional Requirements, 125 PUB. HEALTH 
REP. 615, 615 (2010). 
54. Id. 
55. See Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 830. 
56. Id. at 829 (stating that the three states addressing compliance are 
Maine, Arkansas, and Rhode Island).  
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vaccination mandate.57 In July 2009, the hospital’s Patient Safety 
Committee recommended requiring vaccination for all employees 
working with patients or in buildings where patient care was 
provided.58 The main reason given was concern over the harm not 
vaccinating could pose to the patients. Dr. Coffin provided 
information about adverse outcomes—up to and including death—
that had occurred to patients from influenza contracted in the 
hospital pre-mandate.59 
The hospital offered a medical and a religious exemption, but if 
an employee refused to be vaccinated without obtaining one of those, 
they were furloughed for two weeks and if they persisted, they were 
terminated.60 Nine employees were terminated.61 Dr. Paul Offit, Chief 
of Infectious Diseases in the Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia, 
explained:  
We actually mandated the vaccine, not only for health care 
workers, but for all employees, and the deal was that if you 
didn’t want to get the vaccine, you had 2 weeks of unpaid leave 
to think about it. If you still didn’t want to get the vaccine, 
then you were asked to step down from your position.62 
In terms of implementing the exemptions, fifty employees 
obtained a medical exemption from 2009 to 2010.63 Dr. Offit explained 
that initially, he was responsible for enforcing the religious 
exemption.64 When that was the case, he required the person 
requesting an exemption to provide a letter from their religious leader 
pointing out where, exactly, in that person’s religious texts there was 
a prohibition on vaccination.65 Under that strict approach, the  
57. Susan Coffin, Carrots and Sticks: Influenza Vaccination of Healthcare 
Workers (2010), http://pahcwfluvaxdotorg.files.wordpress.com/2011/ 
06/coffin_flu-vax-of-hcw-chop_june-20101.pdf.  
58. Id. 
59. Id.  
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Paul A. Offit, Mandating Influenza Vaccine: One Hospital’s Experience 
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/ 
728352?src=sttwit. 
63. Coffin, supra note 57.  
64. Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, Director of the Vaccine 
Education Center, at The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (June 12, 
2014).  
65. As will be discussed later, if this had gone to court, that approach 
would probably have been found unconstitutional. See notes 186-188 
and accompanying text.  
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number of religious exemptions was extremely limited (only two such 
exemptions were granted).66  
In subsequent years, the hospital transferred the decision making 
to a former federal judge, who adopted a more lenient approach, and 
the number of religious exemptions became higher.67 Still, the vast 
majority of employees complied. This is in line with the experience in 
other hospitals, where mandating vaccination led to very high rates of 
employees being vaccinated.68 
The accommodation offered to those who received a medical or 
religious exemption was wearing a facemask during influenza season, 
which Dr. Offit noted is not as effective in preventing transmission of 
influenza.69 Still, as explained above, the number of employees taking 
advantage of the accommodation in the first years was very, very 
small. 
We asked Dr. Offit why the hospital provides a religious 
accommodation at all, and he explained that it was not because the 
hospital thought it was legally required to provide it, but rather it 
was out of respect for religious values.70  
In Valent v. Board of Review, a New Jersey Court of Appeals 
described the way the mandate was implemented by Hackettstown 
Community Hospital: 
Effective September 21, 2010, Adventist Health Care, Inc., the 
corporate owners of HCH, issued a policy in its “Corporate 
Policy Manual” titled “Health Care Worker Flu Prevention 
Plan.” The purpose of the policy was to enhance “health care 
worker vaccination rates and prevent[] the spread of the flu 
during the flu season or pandemic, to patients, residents, [health 
care workers] and their families, as well as the community.” 
Participation with the flu vaccination directive was mandatory 
“unless there [was] a documented medical or religious 
exemption. For those with an exemption, a declination form 
 
66. Coffin, supra note 57. 
67. Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, supra note 64. 
68. Bridget A. Gaughan, The Successful Implementation of Mandatory 
Seasonal Influenza Vaccination for Health Care Workers at an 
Academic Medical Center, 38 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL e51, e51 
(2010); R.M. Rakita et al., Mandatory Influenza Vaccination of 
Healthcare Workers: A 5-Year Study, 31 INFECTION CONTROL HOSP. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 881, 881 (2010).  
69. Telephone Interview with Dr. Paul Offit, Director of the Vaccine 
Education Center, at The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (June 12, 
2014).  And see discussion near footnotes 144-147. 
70. Id.  
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must be signed and accompanied with an appropriate note each 
year. In addition, regardless of where [employees] work, for 
those who must decline the flu vaccine, it will be mandatory to 
properly wear a facemask (available at the facility) during the 
entire flu season, to be determined by [employer] based on 
[Center for Disease Control] guidelines. Failure to comply with 
this policy will result in progressive discipline up to and 
including termination.”71 
Again, the hospital chose a policy that requires immunization and 
offered a medical and religious exemption. The fate of its religious 
exemption is discussed in Section III.b. 
B. State Mandates 
Another potential source for mandates is state-wide legislation or 
regulation. Stewart and Cox reviewed state laws related to influenza 
vaccination of health care workers in 2012.72 They found that twenty 
states had laws on the issue, though none of them matched the model 
statute Stewart and Cox proposed.73 These statutes generally required 
immunization and documenting the practice, though relatively few of 
them required employers to cover the cost.74  
Enforcement provisions were scarce: most statutes did not require 
that employees be dismissed for non-compliance or have other 
sanctions, suggesting that the statutes were not exactly full 
mandates.75 Only three of those states actually addressed handling 
non-compliance. 
In Arkansas, employers not in compliance with the vaccination 
requirements will be sanctioned. Maine public health officials, on the 
other hand, will exclude an HCP from work if they pose a “clear 
danger to the health of others.” An exempted HCP may receive 
immunization or be tested to determine their immune status. Those 
who are shown to not be immune “must be excluded from the work 
site during one incubation period.”76 
Rhode Island differs: 
Rhode Island requires HCP who are exempt from the 
vaccination requirement to wear a surgical face mask when the 
 
71. Valent v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644, 644-645 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014). 
72. See generally Stewart & Cox, supra note 5.  
73. See id. at 829 (Table 2). 
74. Id.  
75. See id. 
76. Id. at 829. 
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Department of Health declares influenza is widespread and when 
the HCP is engaged in direct contact with patients. HCP who 
refuse to comply are subject to a $100 fine for each act. The 
HCP may be disciplined by the licensing board for 
unprofessional conduct.77 
Others described Rhode Island as the only state with a real 
mandate.78 
There have been several recent additions to states that issue 
mandates via regulations. In 2012, the Colorado Board of Health 
enacted rules that require licensed facilities to meet a specified 
threshold of immunized workers by a set date.79  The licensing 
requirements provide that: 
10.6 If a licensed healthcare entity demonstrates that it has 
vaccinated a targeted percentage of its employees in a given 
year, using its own methodology, it shall be exempt from the 
requirements of sections 10.7 through 10.12 of this Part for the 
following year as long as it continues to use the same or more 
stringent methodology.  
(A) The minimum targets required for this exemption are:  
(1) 60 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31, 
2012; 
(2) 75 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31, 
2013; and  
(3) 90 percent of employees vaccinated by December 31, 
2014; and by December 31 of each year thereafter.80 
Requirements 10.7-10.12 include a requirement to offer the vaccine 
and document meeting the proposed set.81 Colorado offered a medical 
exemption.82 The Colorado approach was to use a licensing tool to 
raise immunization rates. This approach may be especially promising: 
states have substantial leeway in setting health and safety 
requirements as license conditions for health care facilities. The topic, 
however, deserves its own treatment, and is somewhat beyond the 
scope of this article.   
77. Id. 
78. Lisa H. Randall et al., Legal Considerations Surrounding Mandatory 
Influenza Vaccination for Healthcare Workers in the United States, 31 
VACCINE 1771, 1771 (2013). 
79. COLO. CODE REGS § 6 C.C.R. 1011-1 (2014). 
80. Id.  
81. Id.  
82. COLO. CODE REGS. § 1011-1-10.8(A)(2) (2013). 
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On August 12, 2014, South Dakota’s Governor signed an 
executive order requiring all state-employed health care workers to 
vaccinate against influenza, unless they obtain one of the exemptions 
offered—medical or religious.83 The order did not, however, mention 
any sanction for non-compliance.84  
In states without clear enforcement provisions, compliance is a 
real issue. On July 16, 2014, Massachusetts’ Department of Public 
Health released a report showing that the program, while not 
inconsequential, was not as effective as hoped.85 Many hospitals failed 
to comply with the target of having over 90% of the workforce 
vaccinated against influenza, and many hospitals did not even meet 
the reporting requirements properly.86 State officials considered taking 
action by citing non-compliant hospitals.87 
Note, however, that most hospitals had over 80% of workers 
vaccinated—an increase compared to before the statute.88 This 
example suggests that a statute—even without a direct enforcement 
mechanism—helps, but more powerful enforcement provisions would 
probably help more. There is evidence that hospital mandates can 
lead to 98% compliance,89 and there is no reason states should not 
achieve similar results.  
States also varied in terms of the exemptions offered. Some 
offered none, some offered only medical exemptions, and two—Maine 
and New Hampshire—offered a philosophical exemption.90  
Several suits were brought challenging statutes and regulations 
related to influenza vaccines.91 While no court actually struck down a 
 
83. Exec. Order No. 2014-11, Office of the Governor, South Dakota (Aug. 
12, 2014), http://doh.sd.gov/documents/order2014-11.pdf.  
84. Id. Summary of CDPHE Rule on Influenza Immunization of Healthcare 
Workers, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/ 
PW_Imm_Summary-of-Board-of-Health-ruling-regarding-influenza-
vaccination-of-health-care-workers.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). 
85. See Chelsea Rice, Mass. Hospital Workers’ Flu Vaccination Rates Fall 
Below Target, BOSTON GLOBE (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.boston.com/health/2014/07/16/mass-hospital-workers-flu-
vaccination-rates-fall-belowtarget/RUftxAYxnNIfBhWoJqHMNO/ 
story.html. 
86. Id.  
87. Id.  
88. Id.  
89. See Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1772.  
90. Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 829.  
91. Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616-17; Wendy J. Parmet, 
Pandemic Vaccines — The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1949, 1951 (2010). 
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statute addressing influenza vaccination, a court in New York, where 
the requirement was in regulations, issued a temporary restraining 
order against the mandate in response to a case.92 Citing vaccine 
shortages, the state withdrew the regulation and the case was 
dismissed.93 Possibly because of this setback,94 New York changed its 
regulation: now the regulation requires documentation of vaccination 
status, and for those workers with no documentation, that they “wear 
a surgical or procedure [sic] mask while in areas where patients or 
residents may be present.”95  
It’s unlikely that a mandate would be found unconstitutional if a 
court had to rule on it. Since Jacobson v. Massachusetts,96 which 
found that fining an individual who refuses to vaccinate is 
constitutional, every state or federal court that ruled on the issue 
gave states dramatic leeway to require immunization, without 
requiring any non-medical exemptions.97 It’s been a long time since 
Jacobson, and in those years, patient autonomy acquired substantial 
importance.98 Substantial debate rages around the continued validity 
of the case.99 Nevertheless, much of the logic holds: as important as 
 
92. See id. (discussing the challenge to the New York emergency 
regulation). 
93. Id.   
94. James T. Mulder, New Ultimatum for CNY Health Care Workers this 
Flu Season: Get a Shot or Wear a Mask, SYRACUSE POST STANDARD 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2013/10/new_ultimatum_for_cny_health_care_workers_this_flu_sea
son_get_a_shot_or_wear_a_m.html. 
95. Nirav R. Shah, DAL: DAL-NH-13-04: Flu Mask Requirements, N.Y. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH (July 17, 2013), https://www.health.ny.gov/ 
professionals/nursing_home_administrator/dal_nh_13-
04_flu_mask_requirement.htm. 
96. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31-32 (1905). 
97. Dorit R. Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in 
Vain: Use and Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School 
Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1558-60 (2014). 
98. Jaime S. King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The 
Case for Shared Medical Decision- Making, 32 AM. J. LAW & MED. 429, 
429-30 (2006). 
99. See, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An 
Extended Response to the Critique of Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 87, 95-96 (2012); Ben Horowitz, A Shot 
in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a Public Health Emergency, 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1730-31 (2011); Christopher Richins, J.D., 
LL.M., Jacobson Revisited an Argument for Strict Judicial Scrutiny of 
Compulsory Vaccination, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 410 (2011); Lawrence 
O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and 
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individual liberty is, sometimes it must be put aside for the public 
good. For example, we still have laws allowing quarantining of 
individuals in certain circumstances.100 If we apply the rational basis 
test to the question of mandatory immunization, upholding influenza 
requirements is an easy question: it’s rational to aim to reduce 
morbidity and mortality from a disease like influenza.101  
We can argue that a person’s autonomy to choose or reject a 
medical procedure is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, subject to a strict scrutiny standard.102 But even under a 
strict scrutiny standard, a state would have a powerful argument 
supporting the statute. Protecting vulnerable patients from a disease 
that can kill or severely hurt them is a compelling interest. In 
Workman v. Mingo Board of Education, the Fourth Circuit found 
that a “state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases 
clearly constitutes a compelling interest.”103 And as discussed more in 
depth in Section III, there really is no good substitute to vaccination 
for preventing influenza. Masks, though they have been used in the 
past, are of limited effectiveness.104 Before resorting to mandates, 
 
Civil Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 580 (2005); 
James Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints: Liberty, Public 
Health and the Legacy of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH, 571, 575 (2005); Wendy K. Mariner et al., Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts: It’s Not your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health 
Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 581, 586 (2005); Note, Toward a Twenty-
First-Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1821-
22 (2008); Wendy E. Parmet et al., Plenary Program: Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 24, 26 (2005). 
100. JASON W. SAPSIN, CENTER FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT 
GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES, PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL 
PREPAREDNESS BRIEFING MEMORANDUM #41: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
AND STATE QUARANTINE AUTHORITY, CENTER FOR LAW AND THE 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH, http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ 
ResourcesPDFs/4quarantine.pdf 
101. Ottenberg et al, supra note 26, at 214. 
102. Dorit Reiss & Lois Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination 
Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine 
Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 897 (2015). 
103. Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  
104. B.J. Cowling et al., Face Masks to Prevent Transmission of Influenza 
Virus: A Systematic Review, 138 EPIDEMIOLOGY AND INFECTION 449, 449 
(2010); Allison E. Aiello et al., Mask Use, Hand Hygiene, and Seasonal 
Influenza-Like Illness Among Young Adults: A Randomized Intervention 
Trial, 201 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 491, 491 (2010); Chandini R. 
MacIntyre et al., A Cluster Randomized Clinical Trial Comparing Fit-
Tested and Non-Fit-Tested N95 Respirators to Medical Masks to 
Prevent Respiratory Virus Infection in Health Care Workers, 5 J. 
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hospitals tried other ways to increase vaccination rates, including 
education and declination forms.105 While not completely ineffective, 
those methods only led to a very modest increase in immunization 
rates.106 It appears that there really is no good substitute to vaccine 
mandates in this context. Even under strict scrutiny review, therefore, 
there is a strong argument that a mandate is constitutional.107 
Patients in a hospital are not just any person on the street; they are 
vulnerable individuals placing themselves literally in the hands of 
health care workers, relying on their care.108 Acting to protect them is 
even more imperative than acting to protect citizens’ lives generally—
and protection of life is already a powerful argument.  
C. Employer-initiated Mandates: Legal Limits  
The situation for mandates is somewhat different for an employer. 
Employment in the United States is generally at-will, which means 
that employers have quite a bit of leeway to set work conditions and 
to dismiss workers who refuse to meet those conditions and 
requirements. Specifically, every state except Montana has a 
presumption of at-will employment, which means the employee can be 
fired for any reason or no reason at all.109  This presumption can be 
overcome if there is an implied-in-fact contract, for example, a 
handbook with employment contracts that set limits on firing. But 
the majority rule is that if there is such a contract, the employer can 
unilaterally change the policy as long as they give the employees 
notice and it doesn’t interfere with vested interests.110  
 
INFLUENZA AND OTHER RESPIRATORY VIRUSES 170, 170 (2011); Faisal 
bin-Reza et al., The Use of Masks and Respirators to Prevent 
Transmission of Influenza: A Systematic Review of the Scientific 
Evidence, 6 J. INFLUENZA & OTHER RESPIRATORY VIRUSES 257, 257 
(2011). 
105. K.A. Bryant et al., Improving Influenza Immunization Rates Among 
Healthcare Workers Caring for High-Risk Pediatric Patients, 25 
INFECTION CONTROL & HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 912, 912 (2004); Tehri 
Tapiainen et al., Influenza Vaccination Among Healthcare Workers in a 
University Children’s Hospital, 26 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSPITAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 855, 855 (2005). 
106. Bryant, supra note 105, at 912. See also Coffin, supra note 60. 
107. Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616-17. 
108. Caplan, supra note 26.  
109. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West); Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R. 
Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (an employer could fire his employees 
for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, including firing 
employees for shopping at a non-company owned store). 
110. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 81 (Cal. 2000) (“As discussed, our 
employment cases support application of contract principles in the 
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Employers may not discriminate in hiring, promotion or retention 
because of disability or because of one of the bases included in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—”race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”111 Aside from those restrictions, an employer has 
substantial leeway to require that employees adhere to conditions set. 
Non-unionized workers, therefore, cannot attack influenza 
mandates set by a private employer except through the lens of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act112 or The Civil Rights Act, 1964.113 
Neither law directly prevents mandates, although employees will 
probably argue they mandate exemptions (see Section III for that 
discussion).  
The situation may be different for unionized workers. The 
question is whether immunization requirements are subject to 
collective bargaining. At least one court answered in the affirmative.114 
In 2004, after a voluntary immunization program still left the staff 
immunization rate at 55%, Virginia Mason Hospital circulated a 
memo announcing a mandatory influenza immunization program.115 
Under the policy, anyone who did not have a religious objection or 
documented vaccine allergy would have to show proof of vaccination 
by January 1, 2005, or face termination “unless he or she agreed to 
 
decision whether an employer may unilaterally terminate an 
employment security policy that has become an implied-in-fact 
unilateral contract.  Under contract theory, an employer may terminate 
a unilateral contract of indefinite duration, as long as its action occurs 
after a reasonable time, and is subject to prescribed or implied 
limitations, including reasonable notice and preservation of vested 
benefits.  The facts clearly show that employees enjoyed the benefits of 
the MESP for a reasonable time period, and that Pacific Bell gave its 
employees reasonable and ample notice of its intent to terminate the 
MESP. The company also did not at any time interfere with employees’ 
vested benefits in effecting the MESP termination. In addition, the 
employees accepted the company’s modified policy by continuing to 
work in light of the modification.  Therefore, in response to the Ninth 
Circuit’s certification request, we conclude that we should answer as 
follows: An employer may terminate a written employment security 
policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of 
indefinite duration and the employer makes the change after a 
reasonable time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering with the 
employees’ vested benefits.”) (citations omitted).   
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964) (“The Civil Rights Act”).  
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (1990).  
113. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964). 
114. Stewart & Rosenbaum, supra note 53, at 616. 
115. Va. Mason Hosp. v. Wash. Nurses Ass’n, 511 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 
2007).  
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take flu prophylaxis medication at his or her own expense.”116 The 
Washington State Nurses Association, a union, filed a grievance that 
went to an arbitrator.117 The arbitrator interpreted the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement as requiring the employer to negotiate with the 
union on this issue and the federal district court upheld the 
arbitrator’s interpretation.118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
turn, upheld the District Court’s decision.119 Note, however, that the 
basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the high level of deference 
due to the arbitrator’s interpretation of the specific collective 
bargaining agreement at issue, not a decision about mandatory 
immunization policies and collective bargaining in general.120  
After the Ninth Circuit decision, the hospital adopted, apparently 
still unilaterally, a policy requiring extensive mask use from non-
vaccinated employees, and the union appealed that policy, this time 
to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), as an unfair labor 
practice.121 After somewhat complex proceedings, the NLRB rejected 
the hospital’s claim that it did not have to negotiate on masks 
because the issue was part of its core purposes under the Peerless 
standard and remanded the decision to the Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) to decide on the rest of the hospital’s claims.122 The ALJ 
decided—and the NLRB affirmed—that the union waived the 
requirement of collective bargaining by agreeing to a specific clause—
the management-rights clause—in the collective bargaining 
agreement.123  
 
116. Id.  
117. Id.  
118. Va. Mason Hosp. v. Wash. Nurses Ass’n, No. C05-1434MJP, 2006 WL 
27203, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2006), aff’d, 511 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
119. Va. Mason Hosp., 511 F.3d at 917-18.  
120. Va. Mason Hosp., 2006 WL 27203 at *7. 
121. WSNA Leads Fight for Nurses’ Rights on Flu Policies (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.wsna.org/labor/Victories/Mandatory-
Immunization/documents/VMMC-2012-07.pdf. 
122. Va. Mason Hosp. (a Div. of Va. Mason Hosp. Ctr.) and Wash. Nurses 
Ass’n, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 5 (Aug. 23, 2011); Peerless Publ’ns, Inc. & 
Newspaper Guild of Greater Phila. Local 10, 283 N.L.R.B. 334, 335-336 
(1987) (setting a test under which some decisions are exempt from 
collective bargaining, if the subject matter goes to “the protection of the 
core purposes of the enterprise,” the rule is “narrowly tailored” to meet 
that objective, and appropriately limited to relevant employees to 
achieve the objectives).  
123. Supplemental Decision and Order, Va. Mason Hosp. (a Div. of Va. 
Mason Hosp. Ctr.) and Wash. Nurses Ass’n, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 1-2 
(June 25, 2012). 
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We do not know what, exactly, happened. It could be that the 
union was not amenable to accepting a flu mandate—Washington is a 
state with relatively high rates of exemptions from school 
immunization requirements,124 suggesting a relatively sizable anti-
vaccine contingency (still a small minority, but larger than in other 
states). It could be that the management acted in a heavy-handed 
manner and the contentious issue was really the power to decide 
rather than the influenza vaccine mandate itself. 
So, what is the takeaway from Virginia Mason Hospital? We 
believe it is that a hospital facing a unionized workforce may be 
limited in its ability to impose a mandatory immunization policy 
without bargaining with the union. A hospital cannot assume that its 
mandatory immunization policies will be upheld against unionized 
workers if they were not reached via collective bargaining. The 
specific limits will heavily depend on the collective bargaining 
agreement’s contents. The safe course for a hospital faced with a 
unionized workforce is to bargain about influenza immunization 
policies and try to get the union on board. If the union will not 
bargain, or if an agreement cannot be reached, whether a court will 
uphold the hospital’s policy will depend on the specifics of the 
collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by the decision maker.   
Other struggles around unionized workers also showed that an 
employer may face trouble applying a mandatory immunization policy 
to the unionized workers without bargaining with the union first, 
though the result is uncertain.125  However, even in Virginia Mason 
Hospital, “vaccination coverage among unionized inpatient nurses in 
this medical center increased from 85.9% to 95.8% between 2005 and 
2010, potentially indicating that mandatory vaccination increased 
facility-wide coverage, even among exempted union workers.”126 In 
other words, even after the court’s initial decision that unionized 
workers were not required to vaccinate, the mandatory policy still in 
place for non-unionized workers continued to achieve high rates of 
immunization.  
III. Exemptions: What is Required?  
This subsection analyzes what is required once a state or 
employer decides to impose a mandatory influenza immunization 
 
124. See Ranee Seither et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children in 
Kindergarten, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 607, 610-11 
(August 2, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ 
mm6230a3.htm. 
125. Randall, et al., supra note 78, at 1773.  
126. Id.  
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policy. An employer or a state may choose to offer certain exemptions 
from the requirements. Experience suggests that the exemptions used 
in the health care worker context mimic those of school immunization 
requirements, including medical, religious, and in a minority of cases 
philosophical exemptions.127 This section explores what the options 
and limits in terms of exemptions are. Are any exemptions required? 
If so, which? And what are the limits on the content of an exemption?  
A. Medical Exemptions 
The first type of exemption is a medical exemption. The CDC 
recognizes that some individuals with specific medical problems 
should not be vaccinated.128 For the injected influenza vaccine, which 
contains inactivated viruses, a “[s]evere allergic reaction (e.g., 
anaphylaxis) after a previous dose of any IIV or LAIV or to a vaccine 
component, including egg protein” is a contraindication, and the CDC 
lists it as a reason not to get the vaccine.129 For the nasal mist, which 
contains attenuated viruses, contraindications are a “[s]evere allergic 
reaction (e.g., anaphylaxis) after a previous dose of IIV or LAIV or to 
a vaccine component, including egg protein” and “[c]onditions for 
which the ACIP recommends against use, but which are not 
contraindications in vaccine package insert: immune suppression, 
certain chronic medical conditions such as asthma, diabetes, heart or 
kidney disease, and pregnancy.”130 
Should a state passing a statute, or an employer mandating 
vaccination, offer a medical exemption? Let’s begin with Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts.131 The statute challenged in Jacobson included an 
exemption from vaccination for “children certified by a registered 
physician to be unfit subjects for vaccination,” but had no equivalent 
exception for adults.132 In response, the Court said,  
 
127. See Stewart & Cox, supra note 5, at 831; Randall et al., supra note 78, 
at 1772.  
128. Chart of Contraindications and Precautions to Commonly Used 
Vaccines, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/vac-admin/ 
contraindications-vacc.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2014). 
129. Id. However, it’s not clear that egg allergy is, in fact, a bar to getting 
the influenza vaccine. See Jonathan Spergel,  Vaccines and Egg 
Allergies: Can People With Egg Allergies Get Vaccines?, CHILDREN’S 
HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA, http://www.chop.edu/centers-
programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/egg-
products#.VvMyw-IrJpg (“Advances in technology have allowed the 
quantities in current influenza vaccines given as shots to be so minimal 
that people with egg allergies can now receive the influenza shot.”). 
130. Chart of Contraindications, supra note 128. 
131. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
132. Id. at 30.  
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[T]his cannot be deemed a denial of the equal protection of the 
laws to adults; for the statute is applicable equally to all in like 
condition, and there are obviously reasons why regulations may 
be appropriate for adults which could not be safely applied to 
persons of tender years.133 
In other words, applying a medical exemption only to children and 
not to adults is not a constitutional problem because there are real 
differences between adults and children.  
But that’s not all the case said. Rejecting Jacobson’s claim of 
medical risk, apparently based on an adverse reaction as a child, the 
Court highlighted that Jacobson did not substantiate his argument:  
[D]efendant did not offer to prove that, by reason of his then 
condition, he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination at the 
time he was informed of the requirement of the regulation 
adopted by the board of health. It is entirely consistent with his 
offer of proof that, after reaching full age, he had become, so far 
as medical skill could discover, and when informed of the 
regulation of the board of health was, a fit subject of 
vaccination.134  
While the Court did not expressly rule on what would have happened 
had Jacobson proven a specific medical problem, it at least implies 
that such a problem would impact the result. This suggests that it 
may at least be unconstitutional to require vaccinations for people 
with medical conditions that make vaccinating dangerous—such as 
people with contraindications. 
This is probably an appropriate result, and should be kept today: 
the rationale behind contraindications is that those individuals are 
put at risk by being vaccinated. Requiring them to sacrifice their 
health or worse for vaccinating is probably asking too much. Rather, 
those people will be protected by herd immunity.135 Since such 
reactions are extremely rare,136 the number of people with 
contraindications is probably small enough to keep rates of 
vaccination in hospitals very, very high.  
On the other hand, one could ask whether it’s appropriate to 
allow people who cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons to have 
 
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 36-37.  
135. David S. Stephens, Vaccines for the Unvaccinated: Protecting the Herd, 
197 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 643, 645 (2008). 
136. Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Safety: A Summary for Clinicians, CDC, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/vaccine_safety.htm 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2014). 
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access to vulnerable patients. The discussion is not, after all, whether 
it’s appropriate to tie people with contraindications down and force 
vaccinate them or to penalize them criminally for not vaccinating. If 
the reason for not vaccinating is medical, there is no fault in not 
doing so, but there may still be good reason to deny people with those 
conditions access to vulnerable patients to whom they might transmit 
influenza. It’s not a matter of penalty nor is it a matter of blame: the 
patient’s interest in being protected against influenza stands in 
opposition to the health care worker’s interest in working in the 
medical field and to the public’s need for qualified and caring health 
care professionals.  
Legislatively, it seems close enough that the state should have 
some leeway to decide if, in that state’s specific circumstances, the 
existence of a medical exemption too seriously undermines the 
protection of patients’ right to health and life, which as discussed, is a 
compelling state interest. There is, however, at least a potential 
argument that a medical exemption is constitutionally required under 
Jacobson.137 
There is an additional factor for both public and private 
employers to consider. In addition to constitutional requirements that 
may force a public employer to offer a medical exemption, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act138 may impose requirements. Sections 
12112(a) and (b) of the ADA require employers not to discriminate 
against disabled workers—a category that is broad enough to include 
those with contraindications—if they can, with reasonable 
accommodation, still do the job.139 Generally, this means that an 
employer should accommodate workers with medical 
contraindications, as the EEOC explained in a memo on the topic.140  
There is an exemption in the ADA if the employer can demonstrate 
“undue hardship” on its operation 141 or, under our jurisprudence, on 
fellow employees.142 This is a fairly high bar requiring “significant” 
difficulty or expense.143  Factors to consider include the cost of the 
 
137. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 36-37. See also Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 
102, at 920. 
138. See 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq. (1990).  
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). 
140. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, PANDEMIC 
PREPAREDNESS IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/pandemic_flu.html (last 
modified Oct. 9, 2009).  
141. 42 U.S.C §12112(b)(5)(A) (1990). 
142. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002).  
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1) (1991). 
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accommodation, which includes sources available to offset it; the resources 
of the facility, size and numbers of employees; the type of operations; and 
the impact of the accommodation on the facility’s operations and on other 
employees.144 
The most commonly used accommodation for employees with 
contraindications is a facemask. Its effectiveness in preventing 
influenza, however, has been challenged, with some claiming that by 
itself it is not particularly effective.145   As discussed above in Section 
III(B), if a regular mask does not properly protect—or if there’s not 
good evidence that it does, in fact, protect—then it’s not a reasonable 
accommodation. A reasonable accommodation is one that allows an 
employee to fill her essential functions without violating her religious 
beliefs.146 Something that does not prevent influenza is not a 
substitute for something that does, and risking a patient’s health in 
the absence of good evidence that masks work is asking quite a bit. A 
heavier mask such as an N95 respirator may be more effective, though 
even there the evidence is mixed, 147 but getting them, especially if 
they are not used regularly, and making sure they are being used 
properly at all times may be a significant expense.148 While this may 
mean that those masks are a reasonable accommodation, the cost may 
be seen as an undue burden. That will be a question of fact.  
Furthermore, there is an additional problem for both masks and 
N95 respirators. Vaccination is a passive precaution: get it one time 
and you’re done, and receipt of a vaccine is relatively easy to monitor. 
All the employer needs to check is that the employee received his or 
her annual influenza vaccine. Alternatives such as masks are 
continuous precautions: they need to be used constantly to work. It is 
very human to forget or to not properly use a mask, so using masks as 
an alternative may require employers to invest more in monitoring,  
potentially making the precaution an undue burden.  
Because of this, masks may not be a reasonable accommodation. 
 
144. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(p)(2) (1991). 
145. Loeb, supra note 51, at 1870 (noting the concerns over reduced efficacy).  
146. See generally Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking 
the Deck?: The “Unfair Advantage” Critique of Perceived Disability 
Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 913 (2000).  
147. See Loeb, supra note 51, at 1870; C. Raina MacIntyre et al., Efficacy of 
Face Masks and Respirators in Preventing Upper Respiratory Tract 
Bacterial Colonization and Co-Infection in Hospital Healthcare 
Workers, 62 PREVENTIVE MED.1, 5 (2014). 
148. See Gio Baracco et al., Comparative Cost of Stockpiling Various Types 
of Respiratory Protective Devices to Protect the Health Care Workforce 
During an Influenza Pandemic, 9 DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH 
PREPAREDNESS 313 (2015). 
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The potential for loss of life from patients infected by non-vaccinated 
personnel is a substantial burden—few burdens can be higher than 
unnecessary, preventable deaths—which would allow employers not to 
provide this accommodation. Nevertheless, employers can still choose 
to provide the alternative anyway. There is an argument they’re not 
required to; but because masks may be at least somewhat effective, 
there is also an argument that the burden is not high enough to 
exempt employers from the ADA. 
Another possible accommodation is reassignment: workers with 
medical contraindications can be reassigned, at least during flu 
season, so as not to work with patients.149 This raises two problems: it 
can lead to staffing shortages in areas that require patient care, 
undermining the hospitals operations; and it can harm other 
workers.150 Reassignment raises issues such as where the reassigned 
personnel will work. Will reassigned employees have to be assigned 
jobs that are, from their point of view, less desirable?    
Finally, some argue that that non-vaccinated employees can be 
seen as a direct threat, and hence the ADA would support vaccine 
mandates—though proponents acknowledge this has not yet been 
done.151 The direct threat doctrine is embodied in § 12113(b).152  The 
provision is vague, and courts have not given it much more 
substance.153  However, one area in which it had been applied is to 
health care workers that may endanger patients in contexts that 
included, among others, HIV infection or alcoholism.154 In those cases, 
courts, while attempting to evaluate the scientific and medical 
evidence, offered a high level of deference to the employer’s 
assessment of the level of threat.155 Here, too, courts are very likely to 
defer to employers’ judgment that an unvaccinated health care worker 
poses a direct threat to patients, especially those from vulnerable 
categories.  
 
149. Andrew T. Pavia, Mandate to Protect Patients from Health Care-
Associated Influenza, 50 Clinical Infectious Diseases 465, 465 (2010).  
150. Befort, Stephan, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation 
Issues: Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
439, 441-442 (2002). 
151. See Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1773-74.  
152. 42 U.S.C. §12113(b) (2009) (stating that qualification standards “may 
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to 
the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”).  
153. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Typhoid Mary” Meets the ADA: A Case 
Study of the ‘Direct Threat’ Standard Under The Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 863-67 (1999). 
154. Id. at 869. 
155. Id. at 871. 
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Still, because the bar is relatively high under the ADA, hospitals 
may be required to provide a medical exemption and accommodations 
to workers with medical contraindications, though it will be a case-by-
case, situation-dependent question.  
B.  Religious Exemptions 
In considering religious exemptions, the first two questions to 
consider are whether they are required in the first place and, if they 
are adopted, whether there are requirements as to the content. The 
answer to these questions affects the choice of whether to provide 
religious exemptions.   
1. Constitutionally Required?  
The Constitution binds state actors. This includes not only states 
passing statutes requiring vaccination of health care workers, but also 
public hospitals. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), which monitors the application of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 by employers (see below), also adheres to our First Amendment 
jurisprudence in implementing the act. Understanding the way our 
courts interpret the First Amendment in this context is therefore 
critical.  
The First Amendment says, in the relevant part, that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”156 Both the establishment of 
religion157 and the free exercise of it158 were incorporated—applied to 
the states—via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The question is whether the First Amendment requires state actors to 
offer a religious exemption to vaccines. Jacobson predates the 
incorporation of the First Amendment towards the states, but 
subsequent jurisprudence strongly suggests that the answer is no.  
Prince v. Massachusetts addressed whether religious freedom 
trumps child labor laws, and answered in the negative.159 In dicta, the 
court in Prince went on to say that a parent “cannot claim freedom 
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on 
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease 
or the latter to ill health or death.”160 Prince came after Cantwell, so 
the free exercise clause already applied to the state, and the Prince 
 
156. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
157. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947). 
158. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
159. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944). 
160. Id. at 166-67.  
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court acknowledged the weight of it. But this dicta in Prince 
reaffirmed that the state has the power to require immunization to 
protect the public health.  
This interpretation had been relied on in subsequent state and 
federal cases. For example, in 2011 the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Workman v. Mingo Board of Education rejected a 
challenge to West Virginia’s lack of religious exemption.161 The Court 
said:  
[T]he state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable 
diseases clearly constitutes a compelling interest. In sum, 
following the reasoning of Jacobson and Prince, we conclude 
that the West Virginia statute requiring vaccinations as a 
condition of admission to school does not unconstitutionally 
infringe Workman’s right to free exercise. This conclusion is 
buttressed by the opinions of numerous federal and state courts 
that have reached similar conclusions in comparable cases.162  
Still, we could raise a question on whether Prince does, indeed, 
definitively address the issue. Prince addressed a situation of parental 
rights over children. In addition to the public health, another 
important interest came into play there: the rights of the child. The 
Prince dicta addressed both. There is an argument that Prince does 
not allow states to overcome religious freedoms where there is not a 
similar compilation of interests, such as a mixture of both children’s 
rights and public health. In the context of health care workers and 
flu, we do not have such a circumstance; the tension—assuming the 
religious opposition is sincere163—is between the freedom of religion for 
health workers and public health, including the welfare of patients, 
some of whom may be children.  
Later Supreme Court jurisprudence addressed this kind of tension, 
though not in the context of vaccination. The most important case is 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith.164 In Smith, the Supreme Court overturned previous precedents 
by ruling that a state can apply a “neutral law of general 
applicability”165 to those with religious objections, except in cases 
where another Constitutional right besides freedom of religion was 
 
161. Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353-54 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
162. Id. (citations omitted). 
163. See footnotes 192-196 and the accompanying text. 
164. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
165. Id. at 878-79. 
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implicated.166 As recently explained by the Supreme Court in Hobby 
Lobby, “The Court therefore held that, under the First Amendment, 
“neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious 
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental 
interest.” 167The Hobby Lobby majority treated Smith as the starting 
point for a First Amendment analysis and based its decision on 
RFRA’s deviation from Smith, clearly leaving Smith untouched. 168 
The dissent expressed even stronger support for Smith.169 
Under this jurisprudence, a general requirement of mandatory 
influenza vaccination with no religious exemption does not violate the 
First Amendment even without a showing of compelling interest. 
Of course, protecting the life of vulnerable patients from influenza 
can be seen as a compelling interest. Under the compelling interest 
analysis, however, one must show that mandatory influenza 
vaccination is the least restrictive means of achieving the goal—a high 
standard, as Hobby Lobby demonstrates.170 That said, as discussed 
more in detail above in relation to accommodations, it’s not clear that 
there is a viable alternative for protecting vulnerable patients: hand 
washing and masks reduce the infection rate, but vaccination on top 
of them reduces it even more. Without vaccination, there will be a 
cost in life. The CDC recommends both hand washing and 
vaccinating.171 Reassigning may be impractical and at the very least is 
extremely burdensome. As also discussed, hospitals have tried 
education and other means before moving to mandates—and those 
were not sufficiently effective. This suggests that a mandate is, in 
fact, the least restrictive means.  
The best conclusion, therefore, is that states enacting statutes 
mandating influenza vaccinations and public hospitals requiring its 
employees to vaccinate are not required to offer a religious exemption 
under our jurisprudence.  
2. Legally Required Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964? 
Both public and private employers have to take into account the 
limits on employment discrimination embedded in Title VII of the 
 
166. Id. at 877.  
167. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) 
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)).  
168. Id. at 2761-62.  
169. Id, at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
170. Id. at 2780. 
171. CDC, CDC Says “Take 3” Actions To Fight The Flu, 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/preventing.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 
2014).  
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Civil Rights Act of 1964.172 Title VII prohibits discrimination based 
on religion (and other attributes not relevant to this paper) in hiring, 
firing, compensating and promoting employees.173  For religion, an 
employer is required to “reasonably accommodate” an employee’s 
“religious observance or practice” unless doing so will be an “undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”174  
Does Title VII require employers to accommodate employees’ 
opposition to influenza vaccination if it is based on sincere religious 
objection? In practice, as discussed above, employers have offered 
exemptions and required facemask usage with varying requirements as 
an accommodation. Another potential accommodation is for 
employers to reassign employees with religious objections to a role 
that does not involve working with patients or with those that work 
with patients—for example, in a separate building. However, there is 
an extremely strong case that neither accommodation is required 
under the Civil Rights Act as interpreted by our courts. To begin, as 
explained above, a mask is not effective in preventing transmission. A 
reasonable accommodation is a question of fact,175 and the question of 
what is reasonable accommodation in the context of influenza vaccine 
mandates has not been directly addressed by the courts, to the best of 
our knowledge. But, if the mask does not prevent infection, the goal 
of the policy—to prevent infecting patients—will not be achieved. An 
accommodation that undermines the goal of the rule is not an 
accommodation an employer is reasonably required to offer.176  
This claim can be challenged by highlighting that an employee 
has a duty to offer reasonable accommodation of some kind unless 
such accommodation causes undue hardship.177 But both suggested 
accommodations—wearing a mask and reassignment during flu 
season—are not required under the undue hardship analysis, either. 
Courts have interpreted the undue hardship standard to impose a 
very low bar. An accommodation imposes an undue hardship if it 
imposes “more than de minimis cost” on the operation of the 
employer’s business.178  
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).  
173. Id.  
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1964).  
175. Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).  
176. See EEOC v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. IP99–1962–C–H/G, 2001 WL 
1168156, at *9 (S.D. Ind. Aug 27, 2001); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. 
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986).  
177. Id.  
178. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To 
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give 
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”). 
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As already discussed, a mask is a continuous precaution, like 
washing hands. This kind of precaution is much more vulnerable to 
employees forgetting, neglecting, or otherwise ignoring the 
requirement to wear a mask. It’s much harder to enforce than a one-
time precaution, like installing seatbelts or getting a shot. Moreover, 
as explained above, the mask’s effectiveness is debatable, and likely 
low: it may well not prevent transmission. Given the ineffectiveness of 
masks and the difficulties of enforcing their use, the cost of allowing 
them could be more sick or dead patients. That’s a substantial burden 
for the operation of a business. In a previous case, a court found that 
an employer was not required to accommodate an employee’s religious 
opposition to wearing pants because there was evidence that wearing 
other clothes created a safety hazard.179 While that case focused on 
the safety of the employee, the safety of patients is no less valuable. 
Experimenting with patients’ safety—or sacrificing it—is an undue 
burden. While the N-95 respirator may be more effective, as 
discussed, requiring employers to provide them when they do not 
normally carry enough to cover constant use is more than a de 
minimis burden. 
Reassigning will also often be a substantial burden: it can deprive 
the hospital of trained workers available to work with patients, 
leading to those areas being understaffed and patients being 
underserved. It can also be a burden on other employees— either 
those who will have to shoulder additional tasks because of 
reassignment, or those without religious objections that will have to 
be reassigned in turn to make room for the objecting employee. 
Employers are not required to reassign employees if doing so will 
impose a burden on other employees.180 Nor is an employer required to 
reassign an employee if that will violate seniority.181 While the burden 
of reassignment is a factual question, in many circumstances 
reassignment would be a burden either on the employer or on other 
employees.  Even more, reassigning in the same building may not 
solve the problem—the employee may still infect others who may then 
infect patients. 
In short, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not require 
 
179. E.E.O.C. v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., 2001 WL 1168156at *1 (“The 
accommodation that the EEOC suggests—’a reasonably close-fitting, 
denim or canvas dress/skirt that extends to within two or three inches 
above the ankle’…would impose an undue hardship on Oak–Rite by 
requiring it to experiment with employee safety…No evidence shows that 
the proposed solution has worked safely in any comparable 
manufacturing setting.”). 
180. See Trans World Airlines, Inc., 432 U.S. at 81. 
181. Id. at 82-83. See also Stolley v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 228 
F. App’x 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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employers to offer a religious exemption. Even if we see wearing a 
mask or reassignment as potential reasonable accommodations, these 
accommodations impose an undue burden on employers and may 
create too high a risk for patients’ health and life.  
3. Religious Exemptions: Constitutional Limits on Content 
If a state or an employer chooses to offer a religious 
accommodation even though it is not required—which is possible 
given the high place religious values occupy in the United States 
society182—Constitutional jurisprudence, mostly decided in the context 
of school immunization requirements, imposes some important limits 
on the content of such an accommodation.183  
First, in terms of content, our jurisprudence defines religious 
beliefs very broadly to include “moral, ethical, or religious beliefs 
about what is right and wrong …[that are] held with the strength of 
traditional religious convictions.”184 The EEOC adopts a similarly 
broad approach in its interpretation of title VII.185 The definition is 
not limitless—it does not extend to political opinions or safety 
concerns, for example—but it is broad.186 
Part of this broad definition is the idea that the exemption cannot 
be limited to organized religions.187 Nor can those implementing a 
religious exemption deny one to someone on the grounds that the 
 
182. Pew Research Center,”Nones” on the Rise: One-in-Five Adults Have No 
Religious Affiliation, at 1, 17 (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf 
(stating that the number of Americans who say religion is important in 
their lives is 58%, as compared to Britain at 17%, France at 13%, 
Germany at 21%, and Spain at 22%); see also KENNETH D. WALD & 
ALLISON  CALHOUN-BROWN, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 11-16 (5th ed. 2007).  As already mentioned, Dr. Paul Offit 
explained CHOP’s decision to offer a religious exemption out of 
recognition of the importance of religion in the United States rather 
than any fears of legal liability. Offit, supra note 69.  
183. See Reiss, supra note 97, at 1558-60. 
184. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). 
185. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 6-7 (Jul. 22, 2008), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf. While the EEOC’s 
guidance document is not law, since in this case it simply encapsulates 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the principle of non-
discrimination between religious beliefs, it probably holds.  
186. Slater v. King Soopers, 809 F. Supp. 809, 810 (D. Colo. Dec. 31, 1992) 
(explaining that a Ku Klux Klan member fired for participating in a 
rally was not discriminated against on religious grounds because “the 
KKK is not a religion for purposes of Title VII. Rather the KKK is 
political and social in nature.”). 
187. See, e.g., Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222-23 (Mass. 1971). 
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official position of that person’s religion does not oppose vaccines. A 
person is permitted to have her or his own interpretation of religious 
requirements, even if that interpretation is in tension with the official 
religion’s position.188 Nor can an exemption be denied because a belief 
appears to the employer irrational or non-credible.189 This is because 
state actors should not have the power to act as “conscience police” 
evaluating religious beliefs.190 The meaning of this, however, is that 
these kinds of exemptions, if offered, are vulnerable to abuse.191  
States or employers may require a showing of sincerity as a 
condition for an exemption. In fact, under some interpretations, Title 
VII could require such a showing.192 Note that for state statutes, in 
the context of school exemptions, states have found that officials may 
not impose such a requirement unless the statute itself requires 
sincerity—i.e., it cannot be read in by the administrators applying the 
statute.193 For example, in order to evaluate sincerity, New York 
engages in a detailed process to examine what the person seeking an 
exemption said and potentially also interrogating the applicant.194  
There is quite some leeway to evaluate sincerity under Title VII. 
 
188. Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 1, 1994). 
189. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the 
argument that witchcraft was a “conglomeration” of “various aspects of 
the occult” rather than a religion, stating that religious beliefs need not 
be “acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others” to be 
protected) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
190. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1558. 
191. Id. at 1588. 
192. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965) (“the threshold 
question of sincerity ... must be resolved in every case.”). See also 
Bushouse v. Local Union 2209, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. 
Implement Workers of Am., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075 (N.D. Ind. 
2001) (“Given the purpose of the protections and special 
accommodations afforded by Title VII, the court concludes that Title 
VII does permit an inquiry into the sincerity and religious nature of an 
employee or member’s purported beliefs before the duty to accommodate 
such a belief arises”). 
193. In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001) (“[T]he statutory 
language lacks any mention of an inquiry by the state into the sincerity 
of religious beliefs. As a result, the Department of Health exceeded its 
legislative authority when it conducted a further inquiry into the 
sincerity of Mrs. LePage’s religious beliefs.”). For a detailed analysis of 
this, see Dep’t of Health v. Curry, 722 So. 2d 874, 878–79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
194. See, e.g., Check ex rel. MC, No. 13–cv–791 (SLT)(LB), 2013 WL 
2181045, at *7-8 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013); Farina v. Bd. of Educ., 116 
F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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The EEOC explains the criteria that can be used to assess an 
employee’s sincerity in the context of a Title VII claim:  
Factors that—either alone or in combination—might undermine 
an employee’s assertion that he sincerely holds the religious 
belief at issue include: whether the employee has behaved in a 
manner markedly inconsistent with the professed belief;
whether the accommodation sought is a particularly desirable 
benefit that is likely to be sought for secular reasons; whether 
the timing of the request renders it suspect (e.g., it follows an 
earlier request by the employee for the same benefit for secular 
reasons); and whether the employer otherwise has reason to 
believe the accommodation is not sought for religious reasons. 
However, none of these factors is dispositive.195  
The ability to demand a show of sincerity reduces, but does not 
eliminate, the concerns about abuse.196 
4. Valent v. Board of Review 
As previously discussed, a New Jersey Court of Appeal recently 
ruled that a hospital offering religious exemptions from influenza 
immunization cannot deny them to those with secular objections to 
vaccination.197  
June Valent began working for Hackettstown Community 
Hospital, New Jersey, in 2009. In 2010 the hospital adopted a policy 
requiring workers to be vaccinated against influenza and offered 
medical or religious exemptions. Employees who qualified for an 
exemption were required to wear a mask.198 
Ms. Valent refused the vaccine, even though she had no medical 
reason, and vaccinating would have reduced her chances of 
contracting influenza and transmitting it to vulnerable patients. She 
was not, however, willing to pretend her reasons for refusing the 
vaccine were religious. She clearly stated that her reasons were 
secular. She did agree to wear a facemask, as any vaccine exempt 
worker would. 
The hospital fired Ms. Valent for violating the policy. The issue 
under consideration was whether she was entitled to unemployment 
benefits. Under New Jersey law, an employer may deny 
unemployment benefits if the employee engaged in misconduct, which 
 
195. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 185, at 13.  
196. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1559-90. 
197. Valent v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 91 A.3d 644, 648 (N.J. Super. 
App. Div. 2014). 
198. Id. at 645. 
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includes violating a reasonable rule of the employer.199 After somewhat 
complex proceedings, the Appeal Tribunal of the Board of Review of 
the Department Of Labor decided to deny her the benefits because 
the employer’s requirements were “not unreasonable.”200 
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the 
benefits. The court ruled that firing Ms. Valent “unconstitutionally 
violated [her] freedom of expression by endorsing the employer’s 
religion-based exemption to its flu vaccination policy.” 201 The policy 
“discriminates against an employee’s right to refuse to be vaccinated 
based only on purely secular reasons.”202 It also determined that 
because the employer offered a non-medical exemption, the policy was 
clearly not driven only by health concerns.203 
This decision is problematic in several ways. The result is 
probably correct: first, the requirement that those with religious 
objections “have a letter from a spiritual leader” discriminates against 
those whose religious opposition does not stem from organized 
religion, and therefore is likely unconstitutional. We are not as 
comfortable commenting on the employment law issues, but denial of 
seven weeks of unemployment—when the employee has already lost 
her job—seems severe. Refusing the vaccine does not seem to be the 
kind of deliberate misconduct that would justify such a sanction.  
Although, the counter argument is that a health care worker who 
violates the employer’s rules by refusing a simple, safe precaution like 
a vaccine is showing a high level of disregard for the safety of 
patients. We would still lean away from denying unemployment 
benefits; on top of firing, it seems petty.  
That said, the decision is extremely problematic in its analysis 
and implication, and should not stand. Let’s start with the legal 
problems, and then address the policy issues. The court found the 
main issue to be that denying Ms. Valent benefits “unconstitutionally 
violated [her] freedom of expression by endorsing the employer’s 
religion-based exemption to its flu vaccination policy”204 and the 
hospital’s policy “discriminates against an employee’s right to refuse 
to be vaccinated based only on purely secular reasons.”205 Neither part 
can stand. First, basing this on freedom of expression rather than the 
 
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(b) (West 2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 12:17-
10.6 (2003). 
200. Valent, 91 A.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
201. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
202. Id. at 648. 
203. Id. at 646-647. 
204. Id. at 644. 
205. Id. at 648. 
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Free Exercise Clause (of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution) is strange. Vaccinating is an act, not an expression. So 
is taking an exemption. The best argument we can suggest in support 
of this ruling is that to qualify for an exemption, Ms. Valent had to 
express a reason. Making the exemption religious restricted her 
freedom of speech by only allowing her to make certain explanations. 
But that’s a strange way to use freedom of speech, and not the way it 
is usually applied. An explanation of why one fits the requirements of 
a waiver is not the same as expressing an opinion. This looks like an 
issue of freedom of conscience, not of expression.  
Similarly, our laws very clearly distinguish between religious 
beliefs and other beliefs. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits discrimination against religion, not against every opinion, 
and requires accommodation of religious beliefs, not every whim. The 
Constitution, too, treats religion differently. It’s true that the 
definition of religious beliefs, as already discussed, is broad;206 but it’s 
not limitless. It does not extend to political beliefs, and it does not 
extend to safety concerns about vaccines. Distinguishing between 
religious and non-religious reasons is not discrimination: it’s treating 
differently two different types of reasons that are already subject to 
different treatment in our legal system.  
Legally speaking, the decision is very problematic. It is also 
problematic policy-wise. Broadly applied, it would abolish the 
distinction between religious beliefs and philosophical exemptions, 
allowing anyone in a state that offers a religious exemption to opt 
out, even if the state requires show of sincerity, even if the applicant’s 
sole reason is safety concerns. Our jurisprudence surrounding 
exemptions was never applied that way—and states offering only a 
religious exemption seem to seek to apply it to a certain set of reasons 
only.  
Further, in Valent, the court found that the religious exemption 
undermined the declared goal of the policy, which is to protect 
patients’ health, because the employees with such exemptions will still 
be putting patients at risk.207 By offering a religious exemption, the 
court said, the hospital admitted that it was not focusing solely on 
health considerations.208 The court concluded that if the hospital is 
willing to put the values some employees hold above patients’ health, 
the hospital should not discriminate among such values.209 
That, too, is problematic. First, a hospital’s willingness to 
 
206. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970); see also notes 
182-183 and accompanying text.  
207. Valent, 91 A.3d at 647-48. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
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accommodate those with religious opposition does not imply 
insincerity in its health concerns or that it’s willing to put them aside. 
It can easily suggest that a hospital thinks religious concerns are very 
important and that it should make an attempt to accommodate, as 
much as possible, both health concerns (by a mandatory policy) and 
religious concerns (via an exemption). A hospital can also legitimately 
anticipate, since most religions do not oppose vaccines,210 that the 
number of religious exemptions will be small, and the harm to health 
less with the policy and exemption than without the policy. 
Forced to extend the exemption to those with secular objections, 
too, a hospital will likely find the health goals undermined. Valent is 
wrong on the law and problematic on policy grounds.  
5. State RFRAs 
 After Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA),211 attempting to reinstate the strict scrutiny 
of statutes that interfere with religious observances. The Court struck 
down RFRA’s application to the states,212 though it still applies to the 
federal government.213 Subsequently, several states passed their own 
RFRAs.214  
Generally, RFRAs revert back to applying strict scrutiny to 
examine statutes that interfere with religious freedom. This means 
those statutes must use the least restrictive means to achieve a 
compelling government interest—a high burden. Note that in states 
where the requirement derives from a RFRA, a new statute can 
deviate from the RFRA—subject to cannons of statutory 
interpretation (for example, the deviation has to be explicit). In states 
where applying strict scrutiny to freedom of religion claims is based 
on an interpretation of the state’s Constitution, a new statute cannot 
deviate from the RFRA.  
How would this affect vaccine mandates? They should not affect a 
 
210. Reiss, supra note 97, at 1569. 
211. 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb–1(a), (b). 
212. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress reenacted a 
more limited, subject specific statute protecting religious freedoms in 
certain contexts—Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U. S. C. §2000cc et seq.—but in 
this context, RFRA still does not apply to the states.  See Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62. 
213. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
214. See Eugene Volokh, What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013 7:43 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom-restoration-
act/ (providing a map of states with RFRA statutes). 
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private employer’s freedom to impose workplace requirements. They 
may affect state statutes, and they may be seen as requiring public 
employers to offer a religious exemption, but not necessarily. As 
explained above, there is at least a strong argument that mandatory 
vaccination programs serve a compelling interest—the lives and 
health of vulnerable patients. If there is no good alternative, then 
they can be seen as the least restrictive means. However, this is a 
higher bar, and it may mean that reassignment, even if burdensome, 
will be required.  
IV. Discussion: What is Desirable in Vaccine Policy?  
Personal autonomy is important. Our system particularly values a 
person’s freedom to refuse medical treatment.215 Our system, under 
Schloendorf and even Jacobson, would almost certainly disallow 
forcible vaccinating of an adult in sound mind. But personal 
autonomy is not limitless. For example, an individual can be 
quarantined if they have an infectious disease and are a risk to 
others.216 As Jacobson highlighted, refusing to comply with reasonable 
public policy can lead to criminal sanctions.217 Our discussion here 
involves a lower level of coercion. It would be untrue to say that a 
risk of losing your job does not limit a person’s options, and hence the 
threat of termination can exert influence or even feel like coercion. 
But an individual’s choice to work in a given field generally comes 
with the understanding that the individual will have to comply with 
some rules and regulations in the work place, and those may change 
over time. This is even truer for an individual that chooses to enter a 
profession as heavily regulated as the health care field. An individual 
making the choice to work in health care should be aware that they 
are entering a profession subject to rules addressing ethics as well as 
health and safety. It is also a service profession, no less than the legal 
field, and an individual should expect to be subject to limits and rules 
to protect the patients that put their trust in the professional. An 
individual is not giving up their complete freedoms, of course, but 
implicit in the autonomous choice of profession is agreement to 
reasonable health and safety regulation—including regulation for the 
health and safety of the patient. Refusing a precaution as simple and 
safe as a vaccine against influenza is refusing a reasonable regulation. 
 
215. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (“Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body”).  
216. City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. L. Div. 
1993). 
217. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). 
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It would not justify tying an employee down and force-vaccinating 
them, but it does suggest the employer is justified in taking lesser 
steps, up to and including dismissing the employee. The employee’s 
rights and interests are not the only ones at stake: patients have 
rights and interests as well, including the right not to be put at higher 
risk of a dangerous disease.  
When we are talking about a private employer, it’s important to 
remember there is a third set of rights involved: the rights of the 
private employer to run their operation according to the standards 
they support. It’s not clear why an employee’s right not to protect 
themselves and others against a dangerous disease should trump an 
employer’s freedom to act to increase the health and safety of patients 
and to have a safer and healthier facility.  
Mandatory immunization policies protect vulnerable patients 
against infection, prevent absenteeism of workers, and therefore serve 
important interests.218 They are desirable.219 We agree with Cox and 
Stewart that the most cost-effective way to impose mandatory 
immunization policies is via state statutes. Going through the 
democratic process can provide the policy with legitimacy, and the 
legislature has, under our Constitution, substantial leeway to balance 
the public health with other considerations.220 But to be effective, 
statutes need to address implementation—to condition continuing 
work on receiving the vaccine.  
If a legislature is unable or unwilling to pass a mandate, there is 
no reason for a private employer not to do so, and there are many 
good reasons to offer it. However, in a unionized workforce, employers 
may face challenges in applying such a policy without bargaining with 
the union.  
We believe both statutes and employer policies should offer 
medical exemptions to those who have acknowledged 
contraindications, under the assumption that those exemptions would 
be limited enough to not create a severe risk and that people should 
not be penalized because they have the misfortune of being allergic to 
a vaccine. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the counter argument, the 
need to protect patients.  
We would argue against offering a religious exemption. The 
constitutional limitations on religious exemptions make preventing 
their abuse extremely hard—and they are not required under the 
First Amendment or under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for 
employers. The one exception is when a state RFRA is interpreted to 
require one.  
 
218. Randall et al., supra note 78, at 1772. 
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V. Conclusion 
When a person chooses to go into health care, that person makes 
an autonomous choice to work in a service profession, serving the 
interests of vulnerable patients. With such choices come certain 
obligations. Among those is the obligation to take basic precautions to 
protect vulnerable patients against infections. It is uncontroversial 
that requiring hand washing is perfectly appropriate. It should be 
uncontroversial that requiring the simple, safe precaution of an 
influenza vaccine is also appropriate. The vaccine would protect both 
the worker and the patients. If a health care worker is not willing to 
take it, he or she is failing in his or her duty to the patients. 
Furthermore, if a health care worker is unwilling to trust a 
medical intervention as well supported by research as vaccines, how 
can he or she trust the rest of the medical science they ostensibly 
provide?  
 
 
 
 
